Non-strategic Models of Industry Dynamics with Shakeout G. 2 Jovanovic and MacDonald's (1994) Model G. 3 Estimating the Jovanovic-MacDonald Model G. 4 Implications of Assuming Perfect Competition became the dominant disk drive supplier to NEC and Toshiba even though NEC had shipped its first 3.5-inch drive two years earlier before Conner and Toshiba only a few months after ("Conner Peripherals Could Become the Fastest Growing," May 1, 1990) .
Although low-cost production in Singapore and later Malaysia was not the only reason
for Conner Peripherals' success, it was a necessary condition.
By contrast, in 1983
MiniScribe was "dying on the vinyl," according to its vice president of manufacturing ("Miniscribe's Far East Secret," March 6, 1989) . Hit hard when a large customer terminated its contracts, the company made an overnight decision to build drives in Singapore. The decision saved the company, according to the manufacturing vice president. Its Singapore base enabled it to become the top producer of According to my own interviews and reading of the data, the truth seems to be in the middle. Seagate's reemergence as the top player in the desktop PC segment had to wait until its merger with Conner in 1996, after the latter ran into financial difficulties due to some unsuccessful investments which were only tangentially related to Conner's main strength. Thus Seagate eventually regained leadership (as MDH highlighted), but only with the acquisition of Conner's strong 3.5-inch products (to the credit of Christensen's thesis).
Regardless of whether we become fans of Seagate or Conner, however, the key fact for this paper is that both of these two top contenders shared the fundamental cost advantage of Singaporean operations, which continued to matter across multiple technological generations. In this sense, I have come to regard offshoring as a larger-scale driving force of industry dynamics than the cycles of product innovations, which was the focus of my previous paper (Igami, forthcoming). As MDH succinctly stated in the above, low-cost production was not the only reason for these firms' successes, but it was a necessary condition. See Online Appendix C.2 (Offshoring and Product Innovation) for more discussions on product innovations. Source: MDH (2000), p. 146, Table 6 .10.
Finally, two statistics from MDH further confirm the importance of offshore production in more quantitative manners. The first is the share of HDDs that American firms shipped from South East Asia: 56% in 1983 and 86% in 1987 (p. 111). The second is Figure 1 , which shows Seagate's historical employment pattern across countries (p. 146, Table 6 .10). seven hundred employees were located in Southeast Asia ("Syed Iftikar," June 3, 1991).
A.2 Offshoring as a One-time Discrete Choice
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Even if some "legacy" facilities in home counties kept operations for a while, their outputs became irrelevant within a year or two anyway, because the demand for computers (hence HDDs) grew exponentially and Kryder's Law (i.e., the doubling of the average HDD capacity every year) constantly pushed existing production capacities into obsolescence, both of which limited the extent to which production adjustments at the intensive margin mattered, especially at the annual data frequency.
Second, MDH and his interviewees use words such as "shifted assembly offshore," "moved (took) production to Singapore," "a dramatic change in the locus of assembly," and "the adoption of a Southeast Asian manufacturing strategy," all of which imply a one-shot, discrete decision akin to technology adoption. By contrast, they never use any phrases that might suggest volume decisions at the intensive margin, such as "adjusted outputs," "gradually increased (decreased) offshore (home) production," or "optimally rebalance capacity utilization rates across plants." Given the nonstationary environment (i.e., the growing demand and the constant advance of technologies), the existing production capacities were almost "perishable," which made "legacy" locations obsolete within a year or two.
Third, industry statistics suggest a rapid shift even at the aggregate level.
13. Virtually all HDD production in 1983 was concentrated in two countries: the United States (72.3 percent of shipments) and Japan (12 percent of shipments). 15. By 1990, eight years after the first HDD was produced in Singapore, American firms assembled two-thirds of their disk drives in Southeast Asia. 
A.3 Offshoring as a Cost-reduction Investment
Virtually every interview and historical account in MDH attests to the fact that both the ex-ante purpose and the ex-post outcome of offshoring were cost reduction. The examples in quotes [2] and [6] Accounting information provides another source of cross validation on the magnitude of change in profit margins due to offshoring. (Figure 3 in section V.B of the main text). This pattern is consistent with the lowering of manufacturing labor costs because these costs enter "cost of revenues" and not R&D or SGA expenses. As an additional piece of suggestive evidence that labor costs experienced structural changes during this period, the number of employees (column 8) exhibits a curious pattern in which it initially decreased by 10% between 1993 and 1994, and then ended up at a higher number in 1995 (4.4% higher than in 1993). Taken together, these changes in profit margins and the number of employees appear consistent with (roughly) synchronous layoffs of high-wage labor in California and hiring of low-wage labor in Singapore. We should keep in mind that accounting profits (in Table 2 ) are conceptually different from economic profits (in Figure 3 in section V.B of the main text), and that IO economists have largely abandoned the use of accounting data because firms have discretion over how and when to book costs (e.g., "depreciation") and hence "profits." Nevertheless, the extent of cost savings due to offshoring seems surprisingly similar between my estimates and in financial statements, and this fact is reassuring as a ballpark sanity check.
operations long time after market entry. Other firms are less appropriate for this kind of casual "beforeafter" analysis because they (1') are privately held firms without public financial records (e.g., many of the smaller players), (2') are conglomerates without HDD-specific financial records (e.g., IBM and most of the Japanese electronics firms), and/or (3') started offshore operations only several years after being incorporated (e.g., Seagate Technology and Conner Peripherals). In terms of modeling choices, these patterns have led me to allow for changes in the marginal costs of production over time, in both home and offshore locations. I abstract from the other South-East Asian countries because MDH (2000) suggest they were a part of supply chains centered in Singapore, and hence did not constitute independent, alternative locations for offshoring firms in the HDD industry.
B. Additional Descriptive Patterns
B.1 Labor Cost in South-East Asia
B.2 Within-location Firm Heterogeneity
The baseline model assumes homogeneity of firms within each location (home and offshore)
up to private cost shocks that are iid across firms and over time. One obvious question asks to what extent such formulations capture the actual data patterns of firm heterogeneity. The overall pattern indicates a high variability of market shares across firms, as well as high volatility over time, both of which appear broadly consistent with the way firm heterogeneity is modeled via idiosyncratic shocks to dynamic discrete choices. Of course, some firms stayed above 1% and others below 1%, for example, so some persistence seems to exist in individual firms' market shares. Nevertheless, firms change their ranks so frequently and significantly that constructing a meaningful measure of persistent productivity is difficult.
Another related question is whether more (or less) productive firms self-select into offshoring (or exit). Let us look at Figure 3 again, which marks with triangles the years in which firms decide to offshore. These triangles are scattered, showing no particular tendencies. That is, some firms fly early, whereas others delay; some firms enjoy relatively high market shares before going offshore, whereas others serve less than 1% of the market when they offshore. By contrast, a growth after offshoring appears more salient than before it, as Table 4 further confirms these impressions, by showing the lack of clear relationships between firms' market share and their propensity to either offshore or exit. Thus these observed relationships (or lack thereof) between market shares and the propensity to offshore or exit seem to agree with the modeling of firm heterogeneity via iid shocks.
See section V.D for a robustness check with heterogeneous organizational types, which is the only firm characteristic that predicted offshoring propensities in a statistically significant manner in my exploratory data analysis (Table 6 in Online Appendix C.1).
HDDs are the most complex component in a PC in terms of moving parts. Figure 4 summarizes the supply chain of physical components. Four main components are heads (read/write heads), disks (platters or "media"), motors, and electronics, each of which constitutes a subassembly chain. The outputs of these four subassembly activities are then brought together for final assembly in cleanrooms, and this final process is the main task for HDD manufacturers. One might suspect that final assembly process would not require much technical expertise and that anyone could make HDDs using components from independent suppliers, but such an impression is completely wrong. According to Jeff Burke, vice president of strategic marketing and research at Seagate Technology, "You have to know how to put heads and disks together. You can buy these pieces, but you will have no idea what to do with them. The HDD business is all about the 'magic' of putting them together and make it work, reliably and economically." 13 And offshoring is part of this "magic." makers, including Western Digital and Toshiba, mostly relied on independent component suppliers during the sample period. Table 5 lists some of the major independent suppliers by component category. All of them established their own manufacturing operations somewhere in South East Asia by the end of the sample period. 
B.4 Product Diversity
The majority of sales was concentrated in only a few quality levels (capacity in MB) within each generation ( Figure 5 , top), because most of the PCs on sale at any point in time came equipped with "typical" HDDs of the year, which were produced by most HDD makers. For this reason, I assume all active firms in each technological generation sell "composite" HDDs with the mean quality, rather than a range of diverse categories.
This specification would be a bad approximation of the reality if, for example, topquality HDDs earned fat premiums relative to typical ones. However, Figure 5 (bottom)
shows the price per quality unit (MB) either remains flat or declines with quality (MB per HDD), suggesting higher-quality HDDs offered more economical bundles of information storage capacity to the buyers, and not exactly a premium category that is particularly profitable for the sellers. This observation alone would not necessarily rule out the possibility that some firms earned above-average profits in certain special categories, but I choose to maintain the characterization of HDDs as highly substitutable high-tech commodities in modeling the dynamic oligopoly game. 
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This exploratory data analysis treats each firm as an independent decision maker (as in monopolistic competition models) and therefore does not incorporate the endogenous evo- 14 For the use of survival analysis in other contexts of international trade, see Besedeš and Prusa (2006) , and Obashi (2010) . 15 Both my data and MDH (2000) suggest Japanese firms were slower to offshore than American firms, and their organizational-type compositions seem to play an important role in generating this gap. That is, most of non-American HDD makers (including Japanese) were part of electronics conglomerates, whereas approximately a half of major American makers were HDD-specialized startups. Other, more nationalitybased explanations would include the possibilities that languages and other cultural barriers, as well as host-country governments' asymmetric efforts and capabilities in inviting Japanese and American firms. Omitted categories are "14-inch" and "Other electronics maker." ***, **, and * indicate signifiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
lution of market structure due to entry, exit, and offshoring. Hence we cannot necessarily conclude much from these estimates, but these patterns are useful for modeling choices. The solution and estimation of a dynamic oligopoly game are computationally expensive, so one has to decide where to focus modeling efforts. My baseline model in the next section will emphasize the firms' forward-looking decisions of entry, exit, and offshoring, fully incorporating the endogenous evolution of market structure. Furthermore, I have also incorporated heterogeneous organizational types of firms (i.e., specialized versus conglomerate structures)
as a sensitivity analysis in the working paper version of this research (Table 4) . By contrast, the firm's size, age, and technological/product generations do not show clear patterns, and hence I will abstract from these aspects and refer the reader to Igami (forthcoming) for further details on product innovation in the HDD industry.
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C.2 Offshoring and Product Innovation
The main empirical analysis in section V.B (Marginal Costs) relies on the firm-level data on market shares to infer production-cost advantage of offshore operations based on the premise that HDD products are homogeneous. However, if firms actually gained market shares no by means of lower production costs but by higher-quality products, we would be wrongly attributing the gains from new products to offshore operations. To investigate whether offshoring is positively correlated with product innovation, I report an additional set of offshoring-timing regressions in this section.
Specifically, I constructed two "product innovation" variables from the original data source. The first is "frontier quality," which captures each firm's highest-quality product in terms of data-storage capacity (across all form factors that the firm produces) in each year. The second is "new form factor," which equals one whenever the firm starts manufacturing new-generation products in terms of form factors (i.e., 8-, 5.25-, 3.5-, and 2.5-inch).
These two variables represent the two most salient dimensions of HDD product innovations. Note: Coefficients greater (less) than 1 indicate higher (lower) propensities to offshore. Firm size is measured by its revenue from HDD sales. % offshore firms measures the fraction of offshore firms in the global market.
Omitted categories are "14-inch" and "Other electronics maker." ***, **, and * indicate signifiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Table 7 reports these offshoring-innovation regressions, using the same template as in Online Appendix C.1. All of the four regressions suggest mildly positive but statistically insignificant relationships between offshoring and the two product-innovation variables. Thus I have come to regard offshoring and production innovation as two orthogonal dimensions of investments.
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D.1 A Static Cournot Example
The relationship between offshoring and competition can be complex in a dynamic setting.
This subsection uses a static Cournot model to facilitate an intuitive understanding as to how the incentives to offshore may change with market structure. This stylized illustration serves to motivate the development of a fully dynamic model of entry/exit and offshoring in the remainder of this section.
Let N and N * represent the numbers of firms that produce homogeneous goods in the North ("home") and the South ("offshore"), respectively. They compete in a single global product market. Home firms produce at a common and constant marginal cost mc, and offshore firms at mc * < mc. Assume a linear (inverse) demand, P = 1 − Q, where Q is the aggregate output. Each firm chooses its output q i (or q * i ) to maximize its profit,
The Nash equilibrium outputs are
as long as the levels of mc and mc * ensure positive outputs.
The most basic comparative static of this Cournot model is that a firm's profit decreases with competition (i.e., a higher N or N * ) because of business-stealing and a downward pressure on the price. Moreover, even if the total number of firms, N +N * , remains constant, more offshore producers (a higher N * , with a commensurate reduction in N ) mean lower π i and π * i because outputs are strategic substitutes in Cournot competition. The reduction of π i and π * i also entails a shrinking gap between them; that is, ∆π ≡ π * i − π i decreases with a higher N * , and hence the reduced incentives to offshore, as Figure 6 (left) illustrates. Thus, from a purely static perspective, offshoring by some firms would seem to discourage further offshoring by the other home firms.
Once we start considering the dynamics of market structure, however, our prediction becomes more nuanced. Because a home firm produces at a higher marginal cost, its profit is lower than that of an offshore firm (i.e., π i < π * i ), which implies a higher propensity to exit in a standard model of entry and exit (to be specified in the next subsection). Through this channel, offshoring by some firms may induce exits of other home firms, and consequently reduce N more than proportionally. Figure 6 (right) shows that ∆π may increase as N * increases and (N + N * ) decreases.
Furthermore, knowing that the increasing presence of offshore firms could trigger shakeouts of home rivals, forward-looking firms in an oligopolistic market may engage in offshoring with strategic motives, in the spirit of a preemption game or as an act of predation. These dynamic strategic incentives may change nonmonotonically with market structure, and hence whether the simple prediction of strategic substitution à la Cournot prevails in a dynamic setting is not obvious. Thus, incorporating these forces seems important for the understanding of the empirical relationship between competition and offshoring.
For these reasons, the remainder of this section builds a dynamic oligopoly model of offshoring with entry/exit to allow for the endogenous evolution of market structure.
D.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Section III.E (Equilibrium) asserted the uniqueness of equilibrium by listing three key ingredients: (1) i.i.d. private cost shocks to discrete alternatives, (2) sequential moves, and (3) a finite time horizon. This section explains why these features lead to a unique equilibrium.
For ease of exposition, consider a simpler version of the game with a finite horizon in which only one player moves within each period. In the following, we will see that this
super-game has optimal substructure and can be solved for a unique equilibrium by dynamic programming: the principle of optimality.
At t = T in any state s T , the last player (i = I) has observed all of the past actions by itself and the other players, draws its private cost shocks, ε(a IT ), and chooses the highestpayoff discrete alternative, a * IT , which will completely determine the terminal state of the game, s ∞ . Because all of these logit draws are i.i.d. across time and players, their past realizations do not affect I's terminal payoffs, π I∞ (s ∞ ), hence I does not face any uncertainty after the draw at T . These draws from the continuous distribution rule out the possibility of multiple alternatives with exactly the same payoffs (i.e., the logit draws break ties), hence there will always be one and only one discrete alternative that maximizes I's payoff at T , In this manner, we may use backward induction to uniquely determine any player i's optimal choice in any period t, conditional on the realization of s t and ε(a it ). Prior to the realization of ε(a it ), we (and the players) may use the logit formula to uniquely determine the optimal choice probabilities conditional on the realization of s t . Let σ i denote player i's strategy in this alternating-move game with (trivially) private information, which is a mapping from effective state (s t , ε(a it )) to discrete actions, a it , for all periods in which player i moves. The repeated applications of the principle of optimality in the above lead to the unique profile of all players' optimal strategies, {σ *
, that is, a unique PBE (or SE). Finally, consider a slightly more complicated case in which multiple players of the same types move simultaneously within a period. In general, there can be multiple equilibria in such a game. However, this stage game à la Seim (2006) features i.i.d. private information (ε i ) and a special entry/exit-style structure with payoffs that change monotonically in the action. That is, each player's payoff increases strictly monotonically with its own action (i.e., π i is strictly increasing in a i ), but the incremental payoff from the action decreases strictly monotonically with the rivals' actions because of product-market competition (i.e., π i is strictly decreasing in a −i because π (N ) is strictly decreasing in N , where N is the number of players who entered). Suppose these players are forced to use symmetric strategies and hence the same choice probabilities, then they will end up sharing some intermediate probability of action at which entry is neither attractive nor unattractive (∆π = 0 at a single N * ). Thus, by restricting attention to type-symmetric strategies, I am imposing such symmetry as well as the uniqueness of the choice probability in the stage game.
E. Additional Estimation and Simulation Results
E.1 Estimates of Entry Cost
Unlike φ and κ, the two main dynamic parameters, I allow {κ ent t } to vary flexibly over time and use the free-entry assumption to bound its sequence, as a by-product of my full-solution estimation procedure. Section IV.C explained this idea, but section V.C did not have enough space to report the estimates, hence I have chosen to display {κ ent t } in this section. Figure 7 plots the sequence of entry cost estimates. To be precise, the graph is show-
, the lower and the upper bounds onκ ent t (see section IV.C for the notation). These bounds should be different numbers in principle, but their differences are often numerically negligible in practice, because the equilibrium values of home firms quickly converge to some low levels whenever more than five offshore rivals exist. 
E.2 Sensitivity of Simulations with respect to δ
Given the global scope of the HDD industry, the sample size is too small to precisely estimate δ, hence my empirical analysis in section V.C (offshoring cost) calibrates δ, the rate of change of offshoring cost, and Table 5 in Figure 4 (right) in section V.C of the main text. The main difference is that the number of offshoring tends to overshoot both the data and the baseline, because the effective offshoring cost (i.e., δ t κ) becomes very low toward the end of the sample period. By contrast, δ = 1.00 and 1.05 make the effective offshoring cost constant or increasing over time, which incentives firms to offshore early. Early offshoring of some firms, in turn, hasten the onset of shakeout among those who stayed home. Such a head start of offshoring and shakeout becomes so pronounced with δ = 1.05 that even (what was supposed to be) the mass-entry phase at the beginning of the sample period is dominated by shakeout, with the number of active home firms (N t ) virtually flat during the first two decades. 18 Thus the main message of the first column is that the baseline calibration (δ = .95) fits the data better than these alternative choices of δ, 19 but some qualitative features of industry dynamics are preserved.
The second column shows the no-offshoring counterfactuals and is a counterpart to Figure   7 (left) in section VII of the main text. The outcomes are virtually identical to each other because, by construction, offshoring cost plays no role in this scenario. This is the scenario in which I set κ so high that δ t κ is also prohibitively high regardless of δ.
The third column shows the unilateral-ban counterfactuals, which correspond to Figure   7 (right) in section VII of the main text. These simulated histories are qualitatively similar to the one based on δ = .95, but we may find some intuitive differences with respect to the timing of offshoring and shakeout. When the effective offshoring cost declines fast (i.e., δ = .90), the number of (non-U.S.) offshorers overshoots the baseline trajectory (i.e., δ = .95), which wipes out American firms more thoroughly. By contrast (but by the same mechanism), the δ = 1.00 and 1.05 cases feature lower numbers of eventual offshorers, albeit at a faster timing due to the additional preemptive motives.
From these sensitivity analyses, we may conclude that the baseline calibration fits the data the best, but that the insights from the policy counterfactuals are not particularly sensitive to the choice of δ. δ primarily affects the timing of offshoring and shakeout in a subtle manner, whereas the policy counterfactuals are designed to alter their overall levels by much larger magnitude.
18 Under δ = 1.05, the effective offshoring cost becomes prohibitively high toward the end of the sample period. The number of offshore firms stops growing and experiences attrition, which leaves some room to breathe for home firms. This is the reason some potential entrants find entry profitable in the late 1990s, when the releases of Windows 95 and 98 generate windfall profits and an upward spike of N t .
19 Note that my maximum likelihood estimation procedure targets the choice probabilities (i.e., actions) and not the number of firms (i.e., states) in the data, hence the latter provides an informative measure of fit.
F. Producer Surplus in Strategic Trade Policy
Why are we interested in studying a case in which the governments set the rates of taxes/subsidies on FDI (i.e., offshoring) to maximize industry profit? A short answer is because this specification (i) reflects reality, (ii) captures the core idea of strategic trade policy theory, and (iii) has been studied in the empirical work on political economy. Regardless of the details, "the general point is that the international marketplace provides strong incentives for unilateral policies aimed at promoting the interests of domestic firms" . 
G. Competitive Shakeout Model
Hopenhayn (1993), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) , and Klepper (1996) presented models of competitive industry dynamics with shakeout, which suggest strategic interactions are not necessarily the key ingredient to explain shakeout. In this section, I investigate this issue in depth by estimating the Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) model using my data.
G.1 Non-strategic Models of Industry Dynamics with Shakeout
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) is not the only model of competitive shakeout, but I have chosen to estimate it for three reasons. First, it is probably the most prominent theoretical model of shakeout. By contrast, Klepper (1996) is primarily a survey paper that summarizes the author's empirical findings in his past papers. Second, theirs is an equilibrium model with rational, forward-looking firms. By contrast, Klepper's (1996) will use the Jovanovic and MacDonald model here.
G.2 Jovanovic and MacDonald's (1994) Model
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) seek to explain why the number of firms first increases and then falls in a typical industry's life cycle. In their competitive model, a basic invention spawns the industry and fuels entry at the beginning (t = 0). Then, at some later point in time (t = T ), a single major "refinement" of the basic technology becomes available, which attracts more entry. Once this new technology has arrived, all firms try to implement it, but only a fraction r (an exogenously given constant probability of innovation) of them succeeds every year. Successful innovators lower their marginal costs from cq to cq/ (1 + θ) and increase outputs, where q is output, c represents the basic technology, and (1 + θ) is the cost-reduction factor. Those who have failed to innovate keep trying (with the same success probability r) and some of them would succeed within several years, but eventually the number of new-technology firms reaches certain critical threshold, at which point the downward pressure on the output price becomes sufficiently large to trigger mass exit of those unlucky laggards.
G.3 Estimating the Jovanovic-MacDonald Model
The key parameters of the model are the innovation probability r, the baseline marginal cost c, and the cost-advantage factor θ. Jovanovic and MacDonald's original empirical implementation tries to simultaneously "estimate" these three parameters along with seven other parameters within a single maximum-likelihood procedure. They use a single timeseries data from the U.S. car tire industry,
, where f t is the number of producing firms, p t is a wholesale price index for car tires, and Q t is the industry output. 
G.4 Implications of Assuming Perfect Competition
Why does the competitive model entail unrealistically high profits and equally unlikely cost I have to turn blind eyes to its less desirable implications, such as unreasonably high profit margins and an astronomical productivity growth due to offshoring, both of which are fundamental to welfare calculations and policy simulations (see next section). Moreover, I would not be able to investigate the firms' offshoring decisions because their model assumes all firms try to innovate (i.e., offshore) and succeed at an exogenously determined constant probability r. Finally, the assumption of perfect competition shuts down the market-structure dimension and simply assumes away any relationship between offshoring and (imperfect) competition.
For these reasons, the purpose of my empirical research necessitates an oligopoly model.
